000 03403namaa2200793uu 4500
001 doab26320
003 oapen
005 20260305123943.0
006 m o d
007 cr|mn|---annan
008 210210s2020 xx |||||o ||| 0|eng d
020 _a9780429030215
020 _a9780429030215
024 7 _a10.4324/9780429030215
_2doi
040 _aoapen
_coapen
041 0 _aeng
042 _adc
072 7 _aHP
_2bicssc
072 7 _aHPK
_2bicssc
720 1 _aMcCain, Kevin
_4edt
245 0 0 _aEpistemic Duties
_bNew Arguments, New Angles
260 _bTaylor & Francis
_c2020
300 _a1 online resource (314 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
490 1 _aRoutledge Studies in Epistemology
506 0 _aFree-to-read
_fUnrestricted online access
_2star
520 _aThere are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology.
540 _aAll rights reserved
_uhttp://oapen.org/content/about-rights
546 _aEnglish
650 7 _aPhilosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge
_2bicssc
650 7 _aPhilosophy
_2bicssc
653 _aAndrew Reisner
653 _aAnne Meylan
653 _aAnthony Robert Booth
653 _abelief
653 _aClayton Littlejohn
653 _adialogical foundationalism
653 _adoxastic dilemma
653 _adoxastic duties
653 _aEma Sullivan-Bissett
653 _aepistemic duties
653 _aepistemic normativity
653 _aepistemic obligation
653 _aepistemic tension
653 _aepistemology
653 _aevidence
653 _afunctions
653 _aimplicit bias
653 _aJennifer Lackey
653 _aJonathan Matheson
653 _aKevin McCain
653 _aLindsay Rettler
653 _aLisa Bortolotti
653 _aLuis Oliveira
653 _aMark T. Nelson
653 _aMatthias Steup
653 _aMiriam Schleifer McCormick
653 _aobligation
653 _aopen-mindedness
653 _aought to believe
653 _aought to reflect
720 1 _aMcCain, Kevin
_4oth
720 1 _aStapleford, Scott
_4edt
720 1 _aStapleford, Scott
_4oth
793 0 _aDOAB Library.
856 4 0 _uhttps://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/26320
_70
_zFree-to-read: DOAB: description of the publication
999 _c92489
_d92489