03157namaa2200433uu 4500001001000000003000600010005001700016006001900033007001500052008004100067020001800108020003100126024004400157040001700201041000800218042000700226072001500233720002800248245004600276260004200322300002200364336002600386337002600412338003600438506005100474520164900525540006302174546001202237650002302249653016602272720002802438720002902466720002902495720002402524720002402548793001802572856011602590999001702706doab70122oapen20260305123949.0m     o  d        cr|mn|---annan210601s2018    xx |||||o     ||| 0|eng d  a9780190609610  aoso/9780190609610.001.00017 a10.1093/oso/9780190609610.001.00012doi  aoapencoapen0 aeng  adc 7aHP2bicssc1 aHutchison, Katrina4edt00aSocial Dimensions of Moral Responsibility  aOxfordbOxford University Pressc2018  a1 online resource  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier0 aFree-to-readfUnrestricted online access2star  aPhilosophical theorizing about moral responsibility has recently taken a "social" turn, marking a shift in focus from traditional metaphysical concerns about free will and determinism. Yet despite this social turn, the implications of structural injustice and inequalities of power for theorizing about moral responsibility remain surprisingly neglected in philosophical literature. Recent theories have attended to the interpersonal dynamics at the heart of moral responsibility practices, and the role of the moral environment in scaffolding agential capacities. However, they assume an overly idealized conception of agency and of our moral responsibility practices as reciprocal exchanges between equally empowered and situated agents. The essays in this volume systematically challenge this assumption. Leading theorists of moral responsibility, including Michael McKenna, Marina Oshana, and Manuel Vargas, consider the implications of oppression and structural inequality for their respective theories. Neil Levy urges the need to refocus our analyses of the epistemic and control conditions for moral responsibility from individual to socially extended agents. Leading theorists of relational autonomy, including Catriona Mackenzie, Natalie Stoljar, and Andrea Westlund develop new insights into the topic of moral responsibility. Other contributors bring debates about moral responsibility into dialogue with recent work in feminist philosophy, and topics such as epistemic injustice, implicit bias and blame. Collectively, the essays in this volume reorient philosophical debates about moral responsibility in important new directions.  aAll rights reserveduhttp://oapen.org/content/about-rights  aEnglish 7aPhilosophy2bicssc  amoral responsibility, moral agency, oppression, structural inequality, power, feminist philosophy, relational autonomy, epistemic injustice, implicit bias, blame1 aHutchison, Katrina4oth1 aMackenzie, Catriona4edt1 aMackenzie, Catriona4oth1 aOshana, Marina4edt1 aOshana, Marina4oth0 aDOAB Library.40uhttps://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/7012270zFree-to-read: DOAB: description of the publication  c92911d92911